Highly-placed sources indicate that Turkey has been deliberating the acquisition of military nuclear capability for some time, but has been constrained by its need to maintain good relations with the USA and NATO partners generally, as well as the EU.
Turkish acquisition of nuclear weapons would significantly transform the balance of power and the strategic dynamic of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Greater Black Sea Basin and the Caucasus, and would be the cornerstone of Turkey’s ambitious program to restore what it sees as its historical pan-Turkist mission. Indeed, without nuclear weapons — at least as far as regional perception is concerned — Turkey could not compete against a nuclear Iran or be seen as an independent ‘great power’ in the region.
As far back as 1998, Turkish media reports indicated that then-Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had offered Turkey co-operation in the
development of nuclear weapons. [Significantly, Nawaz Sharif is poised
to make a political comeback in Pakistan in the next general elections].
What is significant is that Turkey played a significant rôle in the
early 1980s in helping Pakistan acquire systems for the development of
the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, and there is little doubt that
Turkey now expects a quid pro quo. Pakistan, despite ill-informed
Western media speculation, has been extremely cautious about sharing its
nuclear weapons knowledge, and may not deliver what Ankara wants with
regard to nuclear co-operation at this point. In 1992, US Senator John Glenn and
other US congressmen accused Turkey of supplying sensitive technology to
Pakistan in order to aid in Pakistan’s acquisition of uranium
enrichment technology.
The Turkish government has been careful about moving ahead with
independent nuclear weapons capabilities until this point because such a
move could have precipitated a cut-off of Turkey from the US and EU
economies and its position within NATO. Now, however, Turkey is reaching
a junction point where Turkish membership of the EU is seen by many in
the Turkish government as no longer feasible or desirable and the AKP is
beginning to feel as though it has the General Staff (GB) more or less
under control and not in a position to challenge or overthrow the
civilian Islamist government. On the other hand, Russia — which more or
less took off the velvet gloves with Turkey in early 2009 to bring
Ankara within the Russian strategic orbit — is not in a strong position
to stop Turkey moving ahead with its nuclear weapons program, just as it
has been unable to stop Iran in its process of acquiring
externally-built nuclear weapons and developing its own nuclear weapons
production capabilities.
Very senior sources in Israel, Russia, and the US have privately
expressed concern that Turkey is proceeding with its nuclear weapons
program, and that Turkey has obtained a significant knowledge of nuclear
weapons technology, protocols, and operational doctrine from its
association with NATO and Israel. Moreover, officials in Israel, Russia,
and the US are fully aware that neither the Turkish government nor the
Turkish military pays any attention to confidentiality clauses, end-user
certificates, or use strictures on weapons, intelligence, or defense
systems made available to Turkey by its allies.
One Israeli official told GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs: “We
are all fully aware that when the Turkish Armed Forces invaded Cyprus in
1974 they did so using US military equipment in defiance of the use
strictures placed on that equipment when it was provided by the US to
Turkey. Today, Turkey is in open violation of all of its agreements with
the US and Israel with regard to the US and Israeli military systems
which are the backbone of the Turkish Armed Forces now occupying
northern Cyprus.”
This was the first disclosure that Israeli military equipment was being
used by the Turkish military in Cyprus, and that this was a violation of
understandings between Turkey and Israel when the equipment was
supplied.
The Turkish Armed Forces have long worked with the US military on the
use of nuclear weapons, particularly artillery-launched, air-delivered,
and theater-level ballistic missile-delivered nuclear warheads and
bombs. US nuclear weapons are still based in Turkey. On November 23,
2009, the US left-leaning Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists — an
anti-nuclear organization — published a report by Alexandra Bell and
Benjamin Loehrke. stating: “Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 [nuclear]
gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly
assigned for delivery by US pilots, and 40 are assigned for delivery by
the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable US fighter
wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not
certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from
other US bases would need to be brought in if Turkey’s bombs were ever
needed.”
Turkish analyst and author Mehmet Kalyoncu, writing on September 19, 2008, in Today’s Zaman
website, noted: “Ankara is intensifying its lobbying in Western
capitals, most notably in Washington, to get the green light to develop
nuclear weapons.”
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